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In this study we argue that when powerholder and target operate in a cooperative context, the de-
cision to use power is influenced by the motive to reach positive joint outcomes. When the con-
text is competitive, the use of power is more dictated by the desire to gain positive outcomes at
the expense of the target. Therefore, factors that are indicative of how to bring about positive
outcomes for the target will only influence power use in a cooperative context. The results of an
experimental study with a 2 (social context: cooperation vs. competition) × 2 (relative compe-
tence: high vs. low) between-subjects design, with task components generating 2 levels of confi-
dence as within-subjects variable, supported our line of reasoning. Competence of the
powerholder as well as confidence as elicited by the task only affected power use in cooperation
and not in competition. The results also indicated that the absolute level of power use in compe-
tition and cooperation did not differ.
It is not an overstatement to say that power and the way power
is handled are central aspects of society. Interaction between
people and the employment of power often go hand in hand;
whether in interaction with friends, family, or employers, at
some point influence will be wielded. It is therefore not sur-
prising that for centuries administrators and scientists (going
as far back as, for instance, Hobbes’s Leviathan written in
1651 and Machiavelli’s Prince written in 1513—see
McClelland, 1996, for an overview) have been intrigued by
power processes. This study focuses on how power use, and
the determinants of power use, may differ between contexts of
cooperative and competitive interdependence.
Because, despite the long-standing interest in power, there
is still no consensus on the nature and definition of power, we
first explicate how we define power in this study and then pro-
ceed to our theoretical analysis of power use in cooperation
andcompetition.The termpowerhasbeenused todescribe sit-
uations where, for example, a legitimate right to direct others
existed, situations where such a legitimate right did not exist,
situations in which persons had successfully engaged in influ-
ence exertion, situations in which a person’s influence at-
tempts were not necessarily successful, situations pertaining
to a person’s relative or absolute control over an other person,
and so on (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Vecchio, 1995/1997).
In this study, as is fairlycommonin the field,weviewpoweras
a potential, that is, as a resource that may or may not be used.
Thus, power is the capacity to influence the outcomes or be-
havior of others (Fiske, Morling, & Stevens, 1996; Pruitt &
Carnevale, 1993). Moreover, power implies features of con-
trol and dominance (Hollander, 1985), and the use of power
often makes the targets of power use do things they would not
necessarily have done on their own accord (Dahl, 1957;
Kipnis, 1976; Vecchio, 1995/1997).
Social Context and Power Use
People utilize the capacity to wield power to achieve a desired
objective, result, or state of affairs. This desired end state may,
BASIC AND APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 23(4), 291–300
Copyright © 2001, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Barbara van Knippenberg, University of
Amsterdam, Department of Communication Science, Oude Hoogstraat 24, 1012
CE Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: vanKnippenberg@wise-worldcom.nl
or may not, coincide with the one that the person being influ-
enced by the powerholder would like to see realized. As a con-
sequence, the powerholder’s attempts to reach some desired
state of affairs may have negative as well as positive conse-
quences for the target, depending on whether the goals of the
powerholder and the target are congruent. Thus, the social
context in which the use of power takes place is an important
aspect of the interaction between powerholder and target
(Tjosvold, 1985, 1995; van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg,
Blaauw, & Vermunt, 1999). Even so, research on power use
rarely explicitly takes the social context into consideration
(for exceptions, see Tjosvold, 1981, 1984, 1985). This appar-
ent neglect of the role of social context is surprising in view of
the fact that power use may be different in nature and may have
different determinants in different social contexts (as we dis-
cuss in the following). Therefore, to shed some light on the ef-
fects of social context on the use of power, this study focused
on power use in two basic social contexts: cooperation and
competition (Deutsch, 1973). Cooperation and competition
permeate all situations in which power use typically is an is-
sue, be it in business, politics, or social life. We argue that in
cooperative task settings qualitatively different consider-
ations affect the decision to exert power than in competitive
task settings. In the following, we first focus on power use in
cooperation, then shift our attention to power use in competi-
tion, and conclude with some considerations regarding the ab-
solute level of power use in competition as compared with co-
operation.
Power Use in Cooperative Task Settings
In cooperative settings, one’s own goals and other’s goals are
positively related and one’s own gains are other’s gains
(Deutsch, 1973; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Behavior in coop-
erative settings will therefore be governed by the motive to
foster mutual gain and the desire to assist the other party in
his or her attempts to reach the common goal. The use of
power is likely to have a similar objective: It will be dictated
by the aspiration to achieve the (common) goal and, thus, by
the desire to aid the other party in attempts to do the same.
Basically, the use of power in cooperation will be affected by
the notion that to help the other is to help oneself.
Assuming that the decision to use power is contingent on
the expectation that power use will be helpful in achieving
the common goal, we may predict that people use power
more easily when they think that their own judgment about
what needs to be done is superior to the judgment of the other
party. Similarly, the Expectation States Theory (Berger,
Wagner, & Zelditch, 1985; Berger, Webster, Ridgeway, &
Rosenholtz, 1986), a theory focused on influence processes
in cooperative task groups, proposes that the higher the per-
formance expectations (i.e., conceptions of one’s own and
other’s capacities to make useful contributions to the com-
mon task) held by one person relative to another, the more
likely that this person will exert influence (Skvoretz, 1985).
An important indicator of the extent to which one may be
able to facilitate reaching positive joint outcomes relative to
the other party’s ability to do so is information about one’s
own task competence and other’s task competence. Thus, in-
dividuals with relatively high task competence may be in-
clined to employ power because they expect that their
influence will facilitate the obtainment of positive outcomes
(cf. French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1992, who also identified
superior knowledge or expert power as a basis for wielding
influence). On the other hand, individuals with relatively low
task competence may expect that their influence in task per-
formance is less valuable than that of the other party, which
makes the employment of power less likely. Indeed, some
evidence pertaining to the relation between task competence
and power use in cooperative context has been found
(Conner, 1977; de Gilder & Wilke, 1994; van Knippenberg,
van Eijbergen, & Wilke, 1999). Thus, we predict that in co-
operative contexts powerholders with higher task compe-
tence than the target will more often use power than
powerholders with lower task competence than the target.
The extent to which the powerholder expects that
power use will help reaching the common goal is not only
dependent on characteristics such as competence. Features
of the task may also have an impact on the decision to use
power in cooperative contexts. Some task components or
aspects of a task are not as clear or as simple as others are.
In some cases, it is easier to assess what an adequate re-
sponse to a certain assignment or task may be than in
other cases. For example, a worker who stands at a con-
veyor belt, performing a task that he or she has performed
a thousand times before, knows what to do and can feel
confident in his or her task-related judgments. In compari-
son, a worker who is confronted with instructions accom-
panying a foreign prefabricated piece of furniture, a new
and (more often than not) difficult task, is less likely to
know which actions may lead to the most successful task
performance and will probably feel less confident. Thus,
some task components give rise to greater confidence
about one’s own judgment of how to deal with them than
others do. We propose that in a cooperative social context
powerholders use their power more often when they feel
more confident about their judgment regarding the task at
hand than when they feel less confident about their judg-
ment. When powerholders have confidence in the correct-
ness of their own task solution, they will more strongly
expect that their power use will facilitate the attainment of
the common goal than when they are less confident about
their judgment and have reason to believe that their judg-
ment may not be correct (Littlepage, Schmidt, Whistler, &
Frost, 1995; van Knippenberg et al., 1999).
An example may clarify our reasoning with respect to the
use of power in cooperation. Take the situation in which a su-
pervisor and a subordinate have to draft up a business pro-
posal. The supervisor is in the position to resolve any
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disagreement by enforcing his or her own standpoints. Yet,
whether the supervisor will actually do so will be contingent
on his or her competence relative to that of the subordinate
and on the extent to which the task at hand gives rise to confi-
dence in his or her own judgment. When the supervisor has
more task-relevant expertise than the subordinate (e.g., when
he or she has years of experience with writing proposals like
these, and the subordinate is a relative novice to the task), the
supervisor will be more likely to overrule the subordinate
than when the subordinate may be considered to be the expert
of the two (e.g., because the supervisor is the novice, and the
subordinate is the more experienced party). In the same vein,
when all relevant information is available, the supervisor
may feel more confident in his or her judgment than when de-
cisions regarding the project have to be based on very limited
information. Accordingly, the supervisor will feel less hesi-
tant to resolve disagreements by imposing his or her own
ideas in the former than in the latter case.
Power Use in Competitive Task Settings
In contrast to cooperation, competition can be defined as a
situation in which one’s own goals and other’s goals are
negatively linked: When the other gains, the self loses
(Deutsch, 1973). Consequently, behavior, and thus also the
decision to use power, will be influenced by the motive to
obtain positive outcomes at the expense of the other and by
the willingness to frustrate the other party in attempts to
reach a certain goal. Thus, in competition, their access to
power may give powerholders the means to increase their
outcomes relative to the outcomes of the other party, and
thus to ensure their “victory” (Tjosvold, 1981). Tjosvold
(1981) argues that, in contrast to cooperative contexts
where powerholders are often faced with the problem of
how to utilize their position to reach the common goal (see
also Friedland, 1976), powerholders in competitive contexts
may feel more secure because it is usually easier to see how
the employment of power will be detrimental to the target.
Indeed, in many task situations it is more obvious what
brings about negative outcomes than what brings about pos-
itive outcomes (e.g., it is often easier to think of hundreds
of wrong answers to a difficult question, than it is to think
of the one correct answer). Therefore, in competition it is,
in general, relatively clear how individuals may utilize their
power to harm the other (and consequently help oneself).
Thus, in contrast to cooperative contexts in which power
use may be contingent on cues regarding the quality of
one’s own task-related judgments, factors that may be in-
dicative of the quality of one’s judgments will affect power
use in competitive contexts to a lesser extent, if at all. In
line with this reasoning, we expect that competence differ-
entials and variations in the degree to which the task elicits
confidence in own task solution more strongly affect the
use of power in cooperation than in competition.
To again illustrate our line of reasoning with an example,
consider the case of the supervisor and the subordinate. In
this case, the attention of both the supervisor and the subordi-
nate are drawn to a particular major account that their depart-
ment is expected to manage. Because this account is
challenging, interesting, and a good career-booster, the su-
pervisor as well as the subordinate want to be the one to han-
dle it. However, only one of them can be assigned the project,
which makes the two parties involved competitors. The su-
pervisor may—to make sure he or she will be the one to man-
age the account—tell the subordinate to take on another
project, making it impossible for him or her to manage the
account in question. In this example, the supervisor wields
power to ensure his or her own victory, and in the process
frustrates the subordinate in his or her desire to handle the
project himself.
Differential Use of Power in Cooperation
and Competition
Our main focus was on the hypothesized greater importance
of task competence and task confidence as determinants of
power use in cooperation. We did however study two other
potential differences between power use in cooperative and
competitive task settings. First, we tested the prediction im-
plied by the previous that power use in cooperation is aimed
at helping the other, whereas power use is aimed at harming
the other in competition. Second, we studied potential differ-
ences between cooperative and competitive task settings in
the frequency with which power is used. Tjosvold (1985)
found that more power was used by powerholders in cooper-
ation than by powerholders in competition. However, we
must be cautious with generalizing his results to other situa-
tions. Tjosvold’s operationalisation of power (in both coop-
eration and competition) consisted of the possibility to give
aid to the other party, for example by providing the other
party with hints that would help to solve a problem. There-
fore, the use of power only served its goal in cooperative set-
tings and not in competitive ones. In reality, as well as in this
study, power use can be instrumental in competition as well
as in cooperation. What, then, should we expect about the
frequency of power use in cooperation versus competition?
On the one hand, it may be argued that more power will
be used by powerholders in competitive situations than by
powerholders in cooperative situations. Because it is, in
general, relatively clear how power in a competitive con-
text can be utilized to attain the desired goal, the absolute
level of power use in competition may exceed the absolute
level of power use in cooperation (i.e., if it is not clear how
power use will help attaining the goal, its use will be less
attractive). More frequent use of power in competitive con-
texts may also explain the negative view on power use in
earlier research on power (see Kipnis, 1976; Tjosvold,
1981), and the rather negative picture of power and power
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use that is painted: Power has been thought to corrupt and
to be used to fulfill selfish needs (Kipnis, 1972; Pfeffer,
1981).
On the other hand, there are also reasons to expect the
opposite, that is, that more power will be used in coopera-
tion than in competition. Several researchers have pointed
out that people are often reluctant to take advantage of their
power to exploit the other (Camerer & Thaler, 1995;
Greenberg, 1978; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; van
Dijk & Vermunt, 2000). This may indicate that a
powerholder is more reluctant to use power in competition
than in cooperation, because instrumental use of power in
competitive contexts entails the achievement of outcomes
at the expense of the other party, whereas this is not so in
cooperative contexts. Because a case can be made for both
hypotheses, we did not formulate an explicit hypothesis
about the effects of social context on the frequency of
power use, but studied it with a more explorative purpose
in mind. In contrast to the earlier research by Tjosvold
(1985), we studied power use in a setting in which it may
be functional in competition as well as cooperation.
To recapitulate, we expect that in cooperative settings
powerholders with higher task competence than the other
use their power more often than powerholders with lower
task competence, whereas this effect of task competence is
smaller or absent in competitive settings (Hypothesis 1).
Furthermore, we expect that when task elements elicit
stronger feelings of confidence more power is exerted than
when task elements elicit weaker feelings of confidence in
cooperation, whereas this effect is smaller or absent in
competition (Hypothesis 2). In addition to testing these hy-
potheses, we investigate whether social context affects the
nature of the influence attempt (i.e., aimed at helping vs.
hurting), and we explore the effects of social context on
frequency of power use.
METHOD
Participants and Design
Sixty-six undergraduate students (27 men and 39 women)
from Leiden University participated voluntarily in the ex-
periment in return for 10 Dutch guilders (about 5 U.S. dol-
lars). Participants were placed in a task performance setting
in which they were randomly assigned to conditions of a 2
(social context: cooperation/competition) × 2 (competence:
high/low) between-subjects design. The degree to which the
participants could be confident in their judgment was ma-
nipulated by presenting task elements for a short (5s) or a
long (25s) period of time. This variable (exposure time:
long/short) was included in the design as a within-subjects
variable. The main dependent variable, power use, was de-
fined as the number of times a participant made use of the
opportunity to force a task solution on to the other.1
Procedure
Participants were invited in groups of eight persons per ses-
sion for a study on decision making. Upon arrival, they were
placed in individual cubicles, each containing an Apple
Macintoshcomputerconnected toaserver.Thiscomputerwas
used to present instructions, stimuli, and questions, and to reg-
ister the dependent measures. Participants were told that the
task on which they would work had originally been con-
structed to measure contrast sensitivity: an ability unrelated to
sex or intelligence, but important for various professions (e.g.,
being an architect or information technology specialist). They
were led to believe that an individual task was to be followed
by a task in which, by computer, contact with one of the other
participants would be realized. In reality, all contact between
participants was simulated. In both tasks participants had to
estimate the number of black squares in a checker board grid
containing a total of 180 black and white squares arranged in a
random pattern (De Gilder & Wilke, 1994). Participants were
unaware of the fact that each grid consisted of 90 black and 90
white squares. Each grid was presented at random for 25s
(long exposure time) or for 5s (short exposure time).
Following the individual task in which 10 different grids
were presented, bogus feedback about competence was pro-
vided, allegedly based on the accuracy of the estimates. In
the high competence condition, it was stressed that the partic-
ipant did better than the other in estimating the number of
black squares (they were also told that they scored 85 points
and that the other scored 53 points on the contrast–sensitivity
scale ranging from 0 to 100). In the low competence condi-
tion, it was stressed that the participant did worse than the
other in estimating the number of black squares (own score:
53 points, other’s score: 85 points).
Instructions for the dyadic and last task were given subse-
quently. The grids used in the dyadic task were similar to those
in the individual task. Hence, the induced competence differ-
entialswere relevant to thedyadic task.Socialcontextwasma-
nipulated by telling participants in the cooperation condition
that their score and the other’s score combined would be com-
pared with the combined score of another couple participating
in the experiment at that time. The couple with the highest
score would earn extra money (5 Dutch guilders per person,
which is about 2.50 U.S. dollars). In the competition condi-
tion, participants were told that their score would be compared
with theother’s score, and thatonly thepersonwith thehighest
score would earn extra money (5 Dutch guilders).
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1Initially, we also constructed a variant of this operationalization of power
use, but manipulation checks indicated that participants did not perceive the
operationalization as intended. Therefore, results pertaining to this attempt
will not be discussed here.
The dyadic task also entailed the possibility for the partic-
ipants to exercise power. Participants were told that the com-
puter had selected them by lot to have the opportunity to
decide upon an estimate they wanted the other to make. In
other words, they had the power to coerce an answer on the
other. Participants had to decide whether to coerce an answer
on the other without knowing which exact estimate the other
supposedly had given. Participants were told that if they de-
clined the opportunity to force an answer on the other, the
other’s personal estimate would be left “untouched.” If par-
ticipants used this opportunity, the other’s initial own answer
would be replaced by the one that the participant decided on.
We made it clear that when power would be used, the other
would know about it. Moreover, the other would learn which
estimate was forced upon him or her.
A total of 12 grids was presented. Following the presenta-
tion of a grid, participants first gave a personal estimate (and
were led to believe that the other did the same). Then they
were given the opportunity to coerce an estimate on the other.
The main dependent variable (power use) was defined as the
number of times a participant made use of this opportunity to
force an answer on the other. Thus, the total frequency of
power use has a minimum of 0 times and maximum of 12
times. Because one half of the presentations had long expo-
sure time and the other half had short exposure time, the
highest possible frequency of power use in both the long and
short exposure time conditions is six times.
After completion of the second task, the successfulness of
the manipulations was established. As a check on the compe-
tence manipulation, participants were asked how good they
performed relatively to the other on the contrast–sensitivity
task (1 = I did much worse; 6 = I did much better). To assess
the successfulness of the manipulation of confidence in one’s
own judgment, participants were asked to indicate both how
certain they were of their estimate when the grids had a long
exposure time and how certain they were of their estimate
when the grids had a short exposure time (1 = very uncertain;
6 = very certain). As a first check on the social context ma-
nipulation (cooperative orientation) participants were asked
to what extent they wanted to help the other to obtain as high
a score as possible (1 = absolutely not; 6 = very much so). As
a second check (competitive orientation) participants were
asked to what extent they wanted the other to gain as few
points as possible (1 = absolutely not; 6 = very much so).
As argued previously, the decision to employ power in co-
operative contexts will be governed by the motive to foster
mutual gain, whereas in competitive contexts the decision to
employ power will be governed by the motive to hamper the
other in his or her attempts to reach positive outcomes.
Therefore, it follows that the use of power in cooperation will
be aimed at giving an estimate as accurate as possible on be-
half of the other, whereas in competition the use of power
will be aimed at giving an inaccurate estimate on behalf of
the other. Given that, regardless of situational context, indi-
viduals will try to be as accurate as possible on their own per-
sonal estimates, the discrepancy between own estimate, and
estimate given on behalf of the other can be regarded as a
measure for the cooperative or competitive intent of the
power wielder. Therefore, to gain insight into the nature of
the influence attempts, we computed the mean discrepancy
between own estimates and the estimates given on behalf of
the other in those situations in which participants decided to
use their power.
At the end of the experiment, participants were thor-
oughly debriefed and paid.
RESULTS
All analyses were conducted with a Competence × Social
Context × Exposure time design, with the exception of the
analysis of the questions asked as checks on the manipulation
of competence and social context, which were conducted
with a Competence × Social context design (i.e., in these
cases exposure time could not be part of the design, because
it is a within-subjects variable based on the power use mea-
sure). As a safeguard against Type I errors, a significance
level of .05 was employed for tests regarding expected ef-
fects, whereas a significance level of .01 was employed for
unexpected effects (Bock, 1975; Hays, 1963).
Manipulation Checks
All participants in the high competence condition considered
their own competence in the contrast–sensitivity task to be
higher than that of the other person (scale points 4, 5, and 6;
M = 5.18, SD = 0.64), and all participants in the low compe-
tence condition considered their own competence lower than
that of the other person (scale points 1, 2, and 3; M = 1.45, SD
= 0.51).
As expected, results indicated that confidence in own task
solution was affected by exposure time, F(1, 62) = 103.35, p
<.0001, η2 = .63. Participants were more certain of their esti-
mates after a long exposure time, than after a short exposure
time (M = 2.47, SD = 1.19 vs. M = 3.83, SD = 1.29). In addi-
tion to the expected effect of exposure time, we found a sig-
nificant main effect of competence. High competence
participants were more certain of their estimates than were
low competence participants (M = 3.77, SD = 0.97 vs. M =
2.52, SD = 0.89), F(1, 62) = 32.65, p < .0001, η2 = .35. This
also supports the idea that competence was induced as meant.
Participants in the cooperation condition more strongly
wanted to help the other to obtain as high a score as possi-
ble than participants in the competition condition (M =
4.48, SD = 1.72 vs. M = 2.88, SD = 1.76), F(1, 62) = 14.28,
p < .0001, η2 = .19. In contrast, participants in the competi-
tive social context more strongly wanted the other to gain
as few points as possible than persons in the cooperative
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context (M = 2.79, SD = 1.81 vs. M = 1.15, SD = 0.44),
F(1, 62) = 24.75, p < .0001, η2 = .29.
Power Use
Theuseofpower in thecooperativecontextwasexpected tobe
influenced more strongly by competence differentials than the
use of power in the competitive context. An analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) revealed that relatively high competent indi-
viduals wielded their power more often than relatively low
competent individuals (M = 5.33, SD = 3.74 vs. M = 3.15, SD =
3.80), F(1, 62) = 6.04, p < .05,η2 = .09. Moreover, as expected,
this effect was qualified by a Competence × Social context in-
teraction, F(1, 62) = 4.13, p < .05, η2 = .06: High competent
persons used power more often than low competent persons in
case of cooperation (M = 6.88, SD = 3.56 vs. M = 2.82, SD =
3.03), F(1, 62) = 9.81, p < .01,η2 = .14, but not in case of com-
petition (M=3.88,SD=3.39vs.M=3.50,SD=4.56), F(1,62)
= 0.07, p > .05, η2 = .00.
We also expected the use of power in the cooperative con-
text to be influenced more strongly by feelings of confidence
in one’s own task solution than in the competitive context. The
results revealed the pattern we expected (note that in the re-
sults pertaining to the effects of exposure time the maximum
frequency of power use is 6 instead of 12): Power was used
moreoftenwhenexposure timewas long(M=2.55,SD=2.04)
than when exposure time was short (M = 1.70, SD = 1.96), F(1,
62) = 12.61, p < .001,η2 = .17. Again, this effect was qualified.
An Exposure time × Social context interaction, F(1, 62) =
4.41,p<.05,η2 = .07, revealed thatpowerwasusedmoreoften
when exposure time was long than when exposure time was
short in the cooperative context only (M = 3.06, SD = 2.44 vs.
M = 1.73, SD = 1.86), F(1, 62) = 15.08, p < .001,η2 = .19, and
not in the competitive context (M = 2.03, SD = 2.30 vs. M =
1.67, SD = 2.09), F(1, 62) = 1.17, p > .05, η2 = .02.
Finally, we found no main effect of social context in rela-
tion to frequency of power use, F(1, 62) = 1.65, p > .05, η2 =
.03. Participants in the competitive context (M = 3.69, SD =
3.94) did not use their power significantly more often or less
often than participants in the cooperative context (M = 4.79,
SD = 3.84).2
We conclude that these results strongly support our hy-
potheses.
Mediational Analysis
Even though results for the manipulation checks suggested
that our manipulations had the desired effects and results for
power use confirmed our predictions, we conducted two addi-
tional analyses to determine whether perceived competence
and confidence indeed mediated the effects of our manipula-
tions on power use. According to Baron and Kenny (1986), a
first requirement for a variable to operate as a mediator is that
variations in levels of the independent variable account for
variations in the presumed mediator. The results for the ma-
nipulation checks indicate that this precondition is met for
both perceived competence and perceived confidence. Fur-
thermore, when controlled for the effect of the presumed me-
diator, a previously significant effect of the independent vari-
able on the dependent variable must no longer be significant
and variations in the mediator must account for variations in
the dependent variable. A first indication that this requirement
is met can be found in Table 1, in which the correlations be-
tween power use and perceived competence and confidence
are displayed. These correlations suggest that the relation be-
tween relative competence and confidence, on the one hand,
and power use, on the other hand, is stronger in cooperation
than in competition. To determine whether the observed inter-
action effects (i.e., the Competence × Social context and Ex-
posure time × Social context interactions) may be attributed to
the difference in strength of these relations, we conducted
analysesofcovariance.Becauseweexpected that the relations
between competence and confidence, on the one hand, and
poweruseon theotherare stronger incooperation than incom-
petition, the more commonly used approach is not appropriate
(Hull, Tedlie, & Lehn, 1992). Rather, the correct analysis in-
cludes the cross product of the proposed covariate and the in-
dependent variable it is intended to moderate (i.e., social con-
text) as predictor variable (Hull et al.).
Thus, to determine whether perceived competence medi-
ated the Competence × Social context effect on power use, we
conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with the fre-
quency of power use as the dependent variable, competence
and social context as the independent variables, and the Per-
ceived competence × Social context interaction as the
covariate (cf. Stevens, 1986). The results indicated that, when
controlled for the main effects of perceived competence and
social context, the Perceived competence × Social context in-
teraction was significant, F(1, 60) = 6.00, p < .05,η2 = .09, and
that the Competence × Social context interaction was no lon-
ger significant (F[1, 60] = 0.57, p > .05,η2 = .01). On the basis
of these results we may conclude that perceived competence
mediated the effect of our competence manipulation on power
use in cooperation and competition.
A similar procedure was followed to determine whether
confidence in own task solution mediated the Exposure time ×
Social context interaction. To circumnavigate the problems
associated with testing a covariate interaction involving a
within-subjects factor, we analyzed the effect of exposure
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2Some evidence pertaining to differential tendencies toward cooperation and
competition by men and women (Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband,
& Carnevale, 1980; van Leeuwen & van Knippenberg, 1999) as well as to differ-
ential use of power by men and women (Aguinis & Adams, 1992; Molm, 1985;
Poeschl, 1999; van Knippenberg, 1999) has been found. Therefore, additional
analyses also checked whether men and women varied in the frequency by
which they used power under cooperative and competitive context. No gender
effects were found (all Fs ≤ 2.78, ps > .05, η2 s ≤ .05).
time for the cooperation and competition conditions sepa-
rately. First, we conducted an ANCOVA with competence as
between-subjects factor, exposure time as within-subjects
factor, and the manipulation checks for confidence in case of
long and short exposure time as covariates for power use in
case of long and short exposure time respectively for the coop-
eration condition. As expected, self-reported confidence was
significantly related to power use, F(1, 30) = 6.58, p < .05,η2 =
.18, for the regression, and the formerly significant effect of
exposure time was no longer significant, F(1, 30) = 0.01, p >
.05,η2 = .00. Even though there was no effect of exposure time
under competition, we conducted a similar ANCOVA for the
competition condition to determine whether there was a rela-
tion between self-reported confidence and power use. As ex-
pected, there was not, F(1, 30) = 2.46, p > .05,η2 = .08, for the
regression. In combination, these results show that exposure
timeaffectedpoweruseundercooperation,butnotundercom-
petition, because confidence was related to power use under
cooperation, but not under competition. Thus, we may con-
clude that the interactive effect of exposure time and social
context on power use was mediated by the differential relation
between confidence and power use under cooperation and
competition.
Nature of Power Use
The analysis of the discrepancy between participants’ per-
sonal estimates and the estimates forced on the other indi-
cated that the participants used power instrumentally in both
cooperation and competition. A small or no discrepancy be-
tween personal estimation and the estimation forced on the
other would be the strategic choice in case of cooperation,
whereas, in contrast, a large discrepancy would be the more
strategic choice in competition. As expected, in the coopera-
tive context estimates given on behalf of the other differed
significantly less from participants’ personal estimate than in
the competitive context (M = 3.32, SD = 5.89 vs. M = 29.55,
SD = 29.04), F(1, 31) = 13.74, p < .001, η2 = .26.3
DISCUSSION
This study dealt with the use of power in cooperation and
competition. Although our main focus was on the determi-
nants of power use, our interpretation of the results for the
factors affecting power use is rooted in the nature of power
use in cooperation and competition. Therefore, we first dis-
cuss these results. The results indicate that the use of power
in cooperation and competition differs (a) in the motivation
or orientation underlying it, and (b) in the effect that it has on
the target of power use. In cooperative settings the goals of
the parties involved are congruent. In contrast, competitive
settings are situations in which the goals of the parties in-
volved are incongruent. This difference in congruency of
goals should result in the development of distinct orienta-
tions. In cooperation the use of power is more likely to be in-
stigated by the desire to help the other in attempts to reach a
certain goal (i.e., because of the congruency of goals, the
powerholder’s success mirrors the target’s success), whereas
in competition the use of power is more likely to be dictated
by the desire to obstruct or hinder the other’s attempts to
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TABLE 1
Intercorrelations for Competition (Above the Diagonal) and Cooperation (Below the Diagonal)
Measures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Total frequency of
power use
— .92*** (.91) .90*** (.89) –.17 (.00) .23 (.21) –.11 (–.04) –.38* (–.38) .72*** (.72)
2. Power use long ET .89*** (.92) — .64*** (.62) –.21 (.11) .26 (.31) –.15 (.02) –.29 (–.32) .63*** (.62)
3. Power use short ET .82*** (.86) .47** (.59) — .09 (–.12) 14 (.05) –.04 (–.10) –.40** (–.38) .67*** (.67)
4. Perceived relative
competence
.19 (.56) .20 (.54) .12 (.45) — .18 (.63) .46** (.76) .30* (–.12) –.13 (–.08)
5. Confidence long ET .28 (.40) .38 (.49) .05 (.19) .44** (.46) — .41* (.66) –.11 (–.22) –.02 (–.05)
6. Confidence short ET .18 (.34) .14 (.30) .18 (.31) .65*** (.53) .54*** (.60) — .09 (–.08) –.22 (–.19)
7. Cooperative orientation .23 (.32) .24 (.31) .19 (.24) .24 (.28) .23 (.28) .26 (.32) — –.60***(–.57)
8. Competitive orientation –.16 (–.24) –.20 (–.27) –.06 (–.14) .20 (–.13) –.07 (–.13) –.10 (–.17) –.36* (–.39) —
Note. ET = exposure time. The correlations not within brackets are partial correlations which have the effect of competence manipulation removed, whereas the
correlations between brackets do not have the effect of the competence manipulation removed. For cooperation as well as competition n = 33. Tests of significance are
one-tailed.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
3An analysis in which the discrepancy between participants’ personal es-
timate and the estimate forced on the other in all cases in which no power was
used was regarded as being zero, led to the same conclusion (Mcooperation =
1.42, SD = 2.53 vs. Mcompetition = 12.19, SD = 23.95), F(1, 62) = 6.66, p < .05,
η2 = .10.
reach a certain goal (i.e., the incongruency of goals makes
this the orientation that is most likely to lead to success for
oneself). Indeed, the checks on the manipulation reflected
exactly this difference in orientation. Moreover, these diver-
gent motivational processes underlying the use of power re-
flected on the nature of power use and on the consequences it
has for the target of influence. The discrepancy between own
estimate and the estimate given on behalf of the other in com-
petitive situations was large in comparison with the discrep-
ancy in cooperation. Large discrepancies suggest that power
was wielded to put a crimp in someone’s style; small discrep-
ancies, in contrast, suggest that power was wielded to aid the
other. Hence, the manner in which power was used in a coop-
erative context may have positive consequences for the tar-
get, whereas the use of power in a competitive context may
have damaging effects for the target’s outcomes.
These results confirm common sense ideas about the dan-
gers associated with giving people access to power in con-
texts that are inherently susceptible to the development of
antisocial behavior. Unregulated power processes in, for ex-
ample, organizations may lead to destructive (though possi-
bly strategically sound from the perspective of the power
wielder) use of power in situations that involve goal
incongruency. Regulations and formalizations aimed at the
streamlining of power use may thus preserve the social inter-
action patterns that are needed to maintain organizational ef-
fectiveness. On the other hand (and on the brighter side), our
analyses of power use in the cooperative settings suggest that
social setting can also instigate pro-social behavior. Trans-
lated to the context of organizations this may mean that a co-
operative atmosphere may lead to power use directed at
helping others, which, in turn, may promote organizational
effectiveness. This interpretation of the negative effects of
power use in competition as compared to cooperation is con-
gruent with conclusions drawn by Tjosvold (1981, 1984,
1985, 1995), as well as with the results of negotiation studies
(Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).
The primary focus of this study was on the determinants
of power use. We found that relative competence of the
powerholder as well as confidence elicited by the task only
affected power use in cooperation and not in competition.
Because it is often easier to see what brings about negative
outcomes for the other (required for successful competitive
task performance) than what brings about positive outcomes
(required for successful cooperative task performance),
powerholders will have less difficulty in assessing how
power use can hamper the other party’s task performance
than how power can be wielded in such a way that both own
and other’s goals can be accomplished. Therefore, factors
that are indicative of how to bring about positive outcomes
for the target, such as competence and confidence, will only
influence power use in a cooperative context. The results of
this study strongly support this reasoning.
These results can be considered important for various
reasons. Primarily, they show that the social context in
which the powerholder and target interact is an essential as-
pect of the power process. Whether a certain factor can be
considered a determinant of power use depends on the so-
cial context in which the behavior takes place. From the
perspective of theory development this means that it is a
prerogative that theories of social power take the social
context into account and develop context-specific hypothe-
ses about the determinants and nature of power use. In this
respect, the distinction between cooperation and competi-
tion, although important, is not the only relevant aspect of
the relationship between powerholder and target. For in-
stance, regardless of the nature of interdependence (i.e., co-
operation vs. competition), the dependency on the other for
relevant outcomes may be a more or less salient factor in
the relationship between powerholder and target (e.g., if the
other is the only source of certain information or certain
services, one’s dependency on the other is greater and more
salient than when one has access to other sources), and
powerholders may be more hesitant to use power the more
dependent they feel on the other (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; van
Knippenberg et al., 1999). Conversely, the less dependent
party may be less interested in the other person (Eberhardt
& Fiske, 1996) and as a consequence may pay less atten-
tion to the effects that power use may have for the other. In
a similar vein, a powerholder who has an ongoing relation-
ship with the target may be more reluctant to wield power
than a powerholder who is certain that the relationship with
the target does not go beyond a single-shot interaction (van
Knippenberg & Steensma, 1999). In sum, consideration of
the social context seems essential for a proper understand-
ing of both the frequency and nature of power use.
Tjosvold (1985) observed a higher frequency of power use
in cooperation than in competition. As we argued in the intro-
duction, this may be attributable to the fact that in Tjosvold’s
study power use was not instrumental in competition. Consis-
tent with this line of reasoning, in this study, where the em-
ployment of power was instrumental in both cooperation and
competition, power was used as often in competition as it was
incooperation.These findingsshowthatwhenpoweruse is in-
strumental in both contexts, there need not be a difference in
the frequency of power use between the two contexts. Yet, this
leaves open the question regarding what factors determine
power use in competitive settings. Given the fact that power
was employed to ascertain victory (see our earlier discussion),
we may wonder why power was not used more often (i.e., out
of 12 occasions in which power could be used, on average it
was only used on 3.69). If the beneficial effects of power use
on the outcomes of the powerholder are relatively apparent,
this could arguably have lead to a higher frequency of power
use in competition than in cooperation. One could argue that
we did not find such behavior to occur more frequently be-
cause powerholders expected that a limited number of ob-
structive acts (i.e., imposing a bad estimate on the other) were
sufficient to win the competition. However, if this were true,
less competent and less confident powerholders should be
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more likely to exert power to ensure their victory despite their
presumably poor estimates (i.e., the reverse of the pattern ob-
served in cooperation). Obviously, this is not what we found.
Thus, a sufficiency principle alone cannot account for power
use in the competitive situation. Presumably, fairness consid-
erations played a part in the behavior of competitive
powerholders. The cardinal rule of fair behavior (Kahneman
et al., 1986) is that an individual may not achieve positive out-
comes at the expense of posing an equivalent loss on the other
individual. This rule of fair behavior may explain that, al-
thoughpowerholdersdidknowhowtouse theirposition to ful-
fill egocentric needs, they were at the same time reluctant to
fully exploit the other. Thus, the negative effects associated
with giving people access to power in contexts that are com-
petitive in nature may be dampened by people’s tendency to
comply to fairness norms (which may be motivated by a will-
ingness tobe fairorbyaconcern forappearingfair).This study
does not supply data about fairness considerations, but future
research may explore the role of fairness to provide insight
into the determinants of power use in competitive settings.
In conclusion, we may focus attention on the fact that
we operationalized frequency of power use as the number
of times people proceeded to coercive and controlling ac-
tion. Arguably, this operationalization of power reflects
only one way in which power can be wielded (Bruins,
1997; Farmer, Maslyn, Fedor, & Goodman, 1997). In the
terminology of this line of research our operationalization
of power use can be described as a hard influence tactic.
Hard influence tactics take control over the situation and
the target and do not allow the target any latitude in choos-
ing whether to comply (Tepper, Brown, & Hunt, 1993). In
contrast, soft influence tactics can be considered to be less
controlling and less aggressive than their harder, more
forceful counterparts. As such, the distinction between hard
and soft influence tactics reflects the difference in forceful-
ness of influence tactics (Raven, 1992; van Knippenberg et
al., 1999; Yukl & Tracy, 1992). Future research may not
only focus on power use in the form of hard tactics (as we
did in this study), but should also pay attention to softer
types of influence.
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